Published on December 24, 2007
Slide1: The KEY to transforming the contemporary Army is REORGANIZATION We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will go under. General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur while serving as Chief of Staff, Army, 1931 Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century Slide2: What is an RMA? Why Organization Matters Why Reorganize the US Army Operational Concept in Breaking the Phalanx Organizational Change: The Combat Group New Paradigm for Readiness, Training, Education and Selection Toward a New Joint Operational Architecture Implications for Combined Operations Strategic Reserve Corps and the National GD. Summary of Key Points Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century Slide3: Examples of RMAs include: Napoleon’s Conduct of Warfare in the early 1800s; German Conquest of France in 1940; American Carrier-based Warfare in the Pacific during WW II; Soviet/Russian Operational Art in the last years of WW II. What is an RMA? Military establishments achieve a Revolution in Military Affairs when they successfully exploit technology, organization, training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat. Slide4: Army Organization for Combat: Determines command relationships; career patterns and professional development Establishes connectivity between communications nodes; Provides structures for information exchange requirements (IER); Results in systems architecture that determines technology and equipment needs and acquisition. Without organizational change, doctrine, tactics, modernization, education, training and readiness do not change! Why Organization Matters Slide5: TODAY’S ARMY IS THE PRODUCT OF THE WORLD WAR II RMA! What was needed 50 years ago is problematic now. Today’s organization limits the growing potential of smart soldiers and new technology! Command relationships are numerous, redundant and vertical; Voice communications drive nodal connectivity; Example : CDRs need (2)-(5) radio nets to monitor battle and issue orders: Structure for information exchange requirements is single service in character, Minimal C2 integration with other Services; Systems architecture is overly complex and dependent on legacy system technology; Current organization restricts flow and exploitation of information; Information capabilities are centralized at the highest level. Slide6: Inserting new technology into the old WW II structure is like “Electrifying the Horse Cavalry.” It is like trying to run Windows 2000 on a Wang Computer The Bottom line: Slide7: What Did the Kosovo Crisis Tell Us About Today’s Army? Must adapt force structure to current and future Strategic Environment within a new Joint Operational Architecture! Plans for Future Army look too much like the Army today. WW II style Divisions Too Slow, Too Centralized; Not organized for rapid deployability within JTF. Mix of Air and Sea lift will get Army Forces to the fight Quick! Must be organized to conduct any mission the NCA assigns - WARFIGHTING OR PSO! Improve the Army’s agility & punch through organizational change to achieve rapid deployability and real Joint Warfighting Capability. Slide8: Information Age compels change in organization. New technology empowers subordinates, decentralizes control and globalizes information. This creates the opportunity to exploit technology at lower levels of command. The technology to enable these changes is here now. The application of new technology to old organizational structures is a design for failure. This was tried during the 1930s by the British and French Armies with disastrous results in WW II. Private sector experience in the last 20 years reinforces this point. Why Reorganize the US Army? Slide9: Armies change governments. Air Power can only attack targets. Stealthy platforms and precision strike weapons are vulnerable to countermeasures (e.g. passive array radars/homing, stealth tracking radars, jamming, cruise missiles..). Precision Strike is a capability; not a doctrine or strategy! A paralyzing strike that is not quickly exploited by forceful maneuver will not force the surrender of an implacable foe. But Army ground forces must integrate seamlessly into the emerging global strike complex, both to exploit its potential and to guarantee the safety of the deployed ground forces. This action can be the basis for a real revolution in military affairs! Why Reorganize the US Army? Slide10: A new organization for combat with a new Joint operational architecture is vital! Cold War force packaging and tiered readiness cannot support current and future national security requirements. Division-based structure is too complex, too large, centralizes too many capabilities at a high level and is too vulnerable to WMD; cannot dominate maneuver in the future! Reorganization will produce significant $ savings! Estimates vary, but internal reorganization of the old Cold War Army Structure could produce 3-4 billion dollars in annual savings that could be rolled into programs for modernization and change. Why Reorganize the US Army? Slide11: A New Operational Concept A New Organization to Execute the Concept that increases Joint fighting power; A New Joint Operational Architecture to integrate Army Forces into the Joint Task Force; A New Approach to Modernization, Training, Readiness, and Education. The approach to transformation in Breaking the Phalanx: Slide12: The Operational Concept in Breaking the Phalanx: Dominating Maneuver The objective of Dominating Maneuver is to gain a positional advantage in time and space that places the opposing force at such a disadvantage that he is compelled to surrender or be destroyed. In the execution of Dominating Maneuver, the Joint Task Force conducts decisive operations incorporating all the features of an RMA! Strategic Dispersal to Strategic Concentration Infiltration on the Operational Level Exploitation and Strike in Depth Conflict Termination on US terms Slide13: The Organization for Combat in Breaking the Phalanx: Integrates and exploits information and capabilities at lower levels and across service lines; Costs less money to modernize and maintain; Is streamlined, functionally based (deep, close, rear) flattened and modular; Exploits digital communications to drive connectivity; Ensures Information Exchange Requirements are Joint; Simplifies the structure to create opportunities to exploit cutting edge technologies across service lines. THE ORGANIZATION IN BREAKING THE PHALANX TO EXECUTE THE NEW CONCEPT IS A PRODUCT OF THE CURRENT RMA! Slide14: Compression of division and brigade into new echelon, to achieve fewer C2 nodes, lower overhead, more teeth, less tail; Dis-establishes selected formations (selected units and headquarters) and unneeded equipment. Retains useful equipment within new, adaptive more deployable framework; Adopts rotational readiness/unit rotation system to make expenditures for training and deployments more predictable in fiscal and human terms. Urges leasing of new equipment (C4I, AH64D engines, Light Armor, etc…) avoids large capital investment up front and keeps pace with rapidly changing technology; Creates substantially greater cohesion and reduces personnel turbulence at the Group level. Change is consistent with the USAF Force and USMC concepts for Expeditionary deployments. How does Breaking the Phalanx do It? Slide15: The Combat Group- Building Block for Change at the Start of a new RMA! The Combat Group organizational structure leverages specialized modules of Army combat power using deep/close/rear functionality within a training and readiness system that ensures the Army is strategically relevant to Joint Operations across the spectrum of conflict.