IEDBrief

Information about IEDBrief

Published on February 4, 2008

Author: Davide

Source: authorstream.com

Content

Slide1:  FORCE PROTECTION WORKING GROUP 16 January 2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY Agenda:  Agenda Threat Update IED TTPs Threat Update:  Threat Update Extremist groups/organizations continue to utilize IEDs to attack Coalition Forces in an attempt to discredit security efforts in Baghdad. Groups will continue to utilize IEDs and entice Coalition Forces into prepared ambushes. 90 Day review of IED attacks: -708 IED attacks -599 IEDs found -298 IED attacks which caused injury (718 casualties) Improvised Explosive Devices :  Improvised Explosive Devices Who are IED’s designed to take out? -Up to now, coalition force/personnel soft targets, HMMWVs, NTVs. -Any time a group of coalition personnel are a soft target or unaware is a perfect situation for employing an IED. Where are we currently finding IED’s? -Primarily along the MSRs and main routes of travel. Why use an IED? -An IED is low cost. More Bang for the Buck -Easily disguised, and exposes the terrorist to a low risk of exposure when attacking. -Anonymity after the event to a bomb-maker is worth the risks of building the bomb. -Psychological warfare at its most vicious level. Improvised Explosive Devices :  Improvised Explosive Devices When can you expect an IED attack? - 24 Hours a day: Because of the reduced exposure time compared to a traditional ambush, anytime is a good time for IED Strike - Morning time. IEDs are placed under cover of darkness - Periods of reduced visibility.  Methods used in Baghdad to detonate IEDs: -Command detonated devices -Hard wired (electrical wires between devices and/or leading away from the bomb. -Remote controlled (battery powered doorbell devices (Sega brand), pagers, cell phones as senders and receiving units) -Tall buildings or line of sight Observation Points will be near by. Many controllers require a direct line of sight to activate the receiver and detonate. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs):  IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) One of the greatest threats to convoys Usually command detonated—wire or remote Materials currently being used for IEDs: 155 Rounds, anti-tank mines, diesel fuel in cans, mogas in cans, rockets, mortar rounds, etc. Basically, if it can explode, it’s being used IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs):  IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) “INNOVATIVE” EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) can be disguised as anything or hidden anywhere: -Trash in the roadway, cigarette cartons, trash bags, soda cans, milk cans, buckets, burlap bags, cinder blocks, potholes, tied to telephone poles, in guard rails and in animal carcasses VERY HARD to spot IEDs at convoy speeds -There is A LOT of debris on the side of the roadway in Iraq…99.9% of it is just trash  What do IEDs look like in Iraq?:  The problem with IEDs is they can look like any common object. EOD has found: Black plastic garbage bags (with 130mm artillery rounds wired in series) A Bus (with a grenade attached to the fuel tank; failed) Milk cartons, pepsi cans, cigarette cartons (with plastique or C4) Burlap bags ( again using artillery rounds) A pothole in the road filled in with dirt and an explosive charge Refrigerator compressor (filled with high explosives and re-welded) MRE bag (bomb platform; common item; easily disguised) Cars, trucks, vans (older models, worn so as not to draw attention) Beware of a beater with worn shocks and springs; overloaded, trash on seats; good tires on a junk car. This is a one-way trip, driver wants no flats. Pipe bombs (Some of the most renowned IED Specialists in EOD have fallen victim to low yield pipe bombs). Dog carcasses filled with explosives  What do IEDs look like in Iraq? IEDs in Iraq:  IEDs in Iraq IEDs in Iraq:  IEDs in Iraq IEDs in Iraq:  IEDs in Iraq IEDs in Iraq:  IEDs in Iraq IEDs in Iraq:  IEDs in Iraq IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs):  IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip The Basic “No Frills” IED Attack IED Placed on Shoulder Mil/Civ Convoy Direction of Traffic Variation: IED Placed in the Median Strip Typical Iraqi 4 lane highway IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs):  IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip The “Broken Down Vehicle” IED Attack Direction of Traffic IED Stopped fake “Broken Down” vehicle canalizes military traffic into close proximity to IED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs):  IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) Median Strip Median Strip Median Strip The “Fiendishly Clever” IED Attack Direction of Traffic The Real IEDs Daisy Chained Together Easily seen Fake IED Visible Wires Lead vehicle sees fake IED and stops. The convoy stops behind it. Real IEDs on flanks of stopped convoy are then command detonated Slide17:  N S Trigger Man Residential Area Vehicular OP departs target area IED Initiation Trigger- Known distance to IED Remote Detonated IED OP Signals Trigger Man Remote Detonation 150 – 300 Meters Trigger Man Line of Site/Observation Remote Detonation Devices: Car Alarms Garage Door Openers Remote Keyless Entry Cellular Telephones THREAT IED TTP: - Components are assembled before emplacement - Takes seconds to emplace - IED camouflaged, looks like trash or part of curb - Attackers are familiar with area - Have rehearsed attack - Known distance from trigger point to IED - IED emplaced on or near over and underpasses - Threat uses terrain to avoid capture - Trigger man within 150 – 300 meters of IED - Utilize OP to signal on-coming US Convoy - Trigger man targets second or last US vehicle - Car Alarms, Keyless Entry, Garage Door Openers Cell Phones used to remote detonate IED - OP Vehicle “faking” car problems - Local population knows who attackers are - Trigger man utilizes residence for concealment - Trigger man disposes of remote detonation device - Trigger man blends into local population - If IED discovered, trigger man remains in place to target EOD and follow-on forces IED KILL ZONE What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  What Can you do to mitigate threat? Keep Alert: Make yourself a “Hard Target” Be Prepared for IED Attack Followed by Ambush Be and Appear Vigilant Personnel Who Look Ready to Fight Back Make Bad Targets Bad Guys Wait for the Next Convoy What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  Maintain Convoy Speed when Possible Maintain vehicle dispersion Be Extra Cautious at choke points -Iraqi Vehicle Breakdowns -Bridges, one way rds, traffic jams, sharp turns, etc… If Something Causes the Convoy to Stop, Watch Your Flanks for IEDs (Post Ops) What Can you do to mitigate threat? What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  What Can you do to mitigate threat? Vests and Helmets Save Lives…Wear Them! Glasses Save Eyesight -Turret Gunner Recently had Shrapnel in Sunglasses after IED Attack Intell Reports that a “Blue X” on Rocks Indicates an IED Site What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  What Can you do to mitigate threat? Rehearse Actions on Contact for an IED Get Out of the “Kill Zone” Fast Do NOT Approach the IED Soldier was Killed Doing this when the IED was Command Detonated as the Soldier “Inspected” It What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  What Can you do to mitigate threat? Before every convoy, brief your personnel on latest IED threat: -What they are using and where they have been emplaced before on our Route Get Them in the right frame of mind -Thinking About IEDS Do it Every Time for Every Convoy…NO Excuses!!! What Can you do to mitigate threat?:  What Can you do to mitigate threat? Trust your instincts. Items you see may make you nervous about the situation or item. It may be the people watching you that makes you nervous or the body language or stress people show may know that something is out there. If people move away from you. You know your zone, you have a feel for what is normal. If it doesn’t feel right move out smartly and report it. Are the familiar locals there or have they left the area? Knowing your AOR and its inhabitants is a great tool for detection. Most bombers don’t blow up their own neighborhoods and they do not like their pictures taken. Presence of news crews may be an indicator. Bomber does not want his picture taken, but he loves to have his dirty work on film. Summary:  Summary IEDs are a Very Real Threat to Convoys IEDs are Disguised as Almost Anything Get Out of Kill Zone Fast and Keep Moving Be and look vigilant, especially when “forced” to Slow Down for a “Disabled Vehicle” or an accident Brief your personnel on IEDs before leaving FORCE PRTOECTION WORKING GROUP (FPWG):  FORCE PRTOECTION WORKING GROUP (FPWG) FORCE PROTECTION IS EVERYONE’S BUSINESS! Security Personnel Need the Eyes and Ears of ALL personnel! Slide26:  FORCE PROTECTION WORKING GROUP 16 January 2004 Questions? COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

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